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EYES ONLY

19 December 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Possible Reorganization of
the Executive Staff

1. Reference is made to your recent request that a review be made of the Executive Staff for the purpose of determining whether a reorganization might streamline procedures and/or eliminate slots.

2. This is to advise that the professional TO of the Executive Staff is [] of these slots being assigned to the Special Security Center, and 4 slots being assigned to the Executive and Planning Division. [] is assigned to [] and really does not come under the day-to-day administrative control of the Special Security Center; [] is a Records Management Officer whose area of responsibilities is rather specialized; and [] devotes the majority of his time to the Security Committee.

3. The mission of the Executive and Planning Division is to serve as a policy and planning component of the Office of Security in security matters which transcend specific organizational components. On the basis of my experience in the Executive Staff, it has become obvious that Messrs. [] are very heavily engaged in coordinating and otherwise preparing position papers that are of direct concern or interest to the Deputy Director of Security or the Chief, Administration and Training Staff. There is a rather close working relationship with A&TS on "planning papers" wherein EPD pulls together supporting reports from all elements of the Office of Security, whereas A&TS addresses the "personnel and money" aspects of the problem. Some overlap and confusion does exist.

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4. With respect to the Special Security Center, it strikes me that the unit is still operating under a broad charter of responsibilities developed in about 1962, when they had a personnel strength of [] people. At the present time it would be much more realistic to limit the activities of the Center, particularly as it relates to security surveys of codeword facilities, briefings, etc., and concentrate on the establishment of security policy, and the interpretation of security policy, related to the compartmented programs. In considering the activities of the Special Security Center, it should be noted that: (a) the unit is basically under-strength for what it is attempting to accomplish; (b) overage personnel such as [] do much to keep the unit functioning, and (c) [] is looking towards retirement in early 1973, thus he is not getting involved in any significant programs.

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5. From an overall standpoint the Executive Staff is functioning at a serious disadvantage, at the present time, because the Executive and Planning Division is located in the Chamber of Commerce Building. It is anticipated that EPD will soon move to the Headquarters Building in an area immediately adjacent to the Special Security Center.

6. In effect the two major elements of the Executive Staff are not really "Centers" or Divisions, " and operating procedures leave much to be desired from a management standpoint. With a view towards streamlining the operation, we might possibly eliminate the GS-15 [] slot in SSC, cut a secretarial slot in EPD, and organize along any of the following lines:

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- A. Combine the SSC and EPD, while limiting their charter to overall "policy" matters, either in standard security or compartmented areas.
- B. Transfer the responsibilities of FPD to Chief, A&TS, and have the Executive Officer concentrate his efforts on the problems of the Special Security Center.

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- C. Split up the responsibilities of EPD between A&TS, command channels, and SR&CD (records management).

7. I leave this to your discretion. At this point I lean towards option 6. A., but would suggest that we defer a final decision about sixty days, until the move has been completed and we have had an opportunity to further assess the overall operations of the Executive Staff. We might give up the slot at any such time that the Office of Security is pressured for further cuts from the top.

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Acting Chief, Executive Staff

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16 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Reorganization Proposal

REFERENCES : (a) Memo to D/S fr C/A&TS dtd 12
Dec 1972, subject: Personnel
Reductions

(b) Memo to D/S fr A/C/ExecStaff dtd
19 Dec 72, subject: Possible
Reorganization of the Exec. Staff

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed in conjunction with other needs of the Office of Security and the following proposal is submitted as a combination of all the others which I feel would streamline management functions within the Office of Security:

(a) EPD would be eliminated as an organizational component within the Office of Security and the positions and functions would be transferred as follows:

(1) GS-15 position C/EPD would be abolished.

25X1A (2) Security policy matters coordination would be transferred to the position in the SSC now occupied by

(3) GS-13 position and GS-07 Secretary position now responsible for USIB matters to be transferred to SSC with functions. (Secretary slot should probably be downgraded at a later date)

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- (4) CS-13 Records Management position and CS-06 Secretary position to be transferred to SR&CD with function and to assume additional function of responsibility for the Microfiche Program.
- (5) CS-07 Secretary position to be transferred to A&TS as a Logistics Assistant position (to be filled by)
- (6) CS-14 Deputy Chief, EPD position to be transferred to A&TS as Planning Officer position.

(b) Concurrent with this action the following action should be taken within A&TS:


- (1) CS-11 Log Officer position would be abolished.
- (2) A&TS would assume all planning and reports functions except security policy functions.
- (3) Deputy Chief, A&TS will be upgraded from 14 to 15.
- (4) Chief, Budget & Fiscal Branch will be upgraded from 13 to 14.
- (5) Chief, Personnel Branch will be upgraded from 13 to 14.
- (6) Chief, Logistics Branch will be upgraded from 12 to 13.

(c) In addition to the above it is still felt to be in the interest of management improvement to abolish the Special Assistant to the DD/IOS GS-14 position and transfer all administrative responsibilities for IOS to A&TS and the operational responsibilities to A/DD/IOS for possible redelegation to C/ID or C/OSD as appropriate.

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2. The net result of the above actions would be the deletion of three (3) positions from the Office of Security T/O and the transfer of two (2) positions to the Microfiche Program which now has one person assigned to it on an overage basis.

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Chief, Administration and Training Staff

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Personnel Reductions

1. In consonance with your directive to explore various ways of consolidating, eliminating, or transferring functions which could impact on future personnel ceilings, I wish to present the following two proposals:

Proposal # 1 - Place the Administration and Training Staff under the Chief, Executive Office and make the following changes in positions:

- a. Abolish the GS-16 Chief/A&TS Position.
- b. Raise the Deputy Chief/A&TS Position to GS-15 and make it the Chief/A&TS Position.
- c. Transfer the GS-14 Planning Officer from E&PD to Deputy Chief/A&TS together with the functions.
- d. Transfer the GS-13 Position now occupied by to the Special Security Center.
- e. Abolish the GS-13 Records Management Officer Position and transfer the functions to Chief/LB/A&TS.
- f. Transfer the GS-07 Secretary Position to LB/A&TS.
- g. Abolish the other GS-06 Clerk Stenographer Position in E&PD.
- h. Abolish the GS-15 E&PD Position.
- i. Abolish the GS-14 SA/DD/IOS Position and turn the functions now being performed by the incumbent of this position to Personnel, Finance, or Logistics Branches of A&TS as appropriate except any operational matters which would be transferred to the ADD/IOS.

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The net effect of this recommendation would result in the reduction of five positions and abolishment of the Executive and Planning Division.

- 1 - GS-16
- 1 - GS-15
- 1 - GS-14
- 1 - GS-13
- 1 - GS-06

It may be possible in view of increased duties to use some of the points from these positions to upgrade certain positions such as Chief/Personnel Branch, Chief/Budget and Finance Branch, and Chief/Logistics Branch.

Proposal # 2 - Transfer the functions of E&PD to A&TS.

- a. The GS-13 Position would go to the Special Security Center.
- b. The GS-07 Clerical Position would go to Logistics Branch/A&TS.
- c. Abolish the GS-15 Chief/E&PD Position.
- d. Abolish the GS-14 Planning Officer Position.
- e. Abolish the GS-13 Records Management Officer Position.
- f. Abolish the GS-06 Clerical Position.
- g. Abolish the GS-14 SA/DD/IOS Position and transfer the duties to A&TS or ADD/IOS as appropriate.

The net effect of this proposal would be to abolish five positions and the Executive and Planning Division and place their functions under Chief/A&TS.

- 1 - GS-15
- 2 - GS-14's
- 1 - GS-13
- 1 - GS-06

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2. I have discussed the above with the Executive Officer who generally concurs in the merger. I have not, however, discussed the deletion of the SA/DD/IOS position with the DD/IOS. It is believed that considerable duplication of effort could be eliminated without any strain being placed on IOS and A&TS if such functions were absorbed within these components. In addition, a large percentage of routine paper work generated by A&TS could very well be released by A&TS for IOS thus relieving IOS of an additional burden. In and Out processing of paper work would be reduced in several components as well.

3. Under either of the above proposals it is felt that efficiency and effectiveness to present functions will not in any way be impaired; it simply means that personnel will be required to work harder and produce more.

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Chief, Administration and Training Staff
Office of Security

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PHYSICAL,
TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY

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1. The Overseas Security Support Division has about [redacted] They conduct physical security inspections at overseas locations and make recommendations to Chiefs of Station for improvement of physical security. Their only follow-up to find out whether recommendations have been adopted is through the next visit, which may be years hence. We may want to take a hard look at this program to try to assess the risks we might be taking if we didn't conduct the inspections. If the recommendations are not adopted and we don't have a systematic follow-up to find out whether they have been adopted, the inspections serve no useful purpose.

2. My recollection is not clear about whether inspections conducted by the Overseas Security Support Division include technical inspections, which are the responsibility of the Technical Division. If not, perhaps they should be, if we continue to make technical inspections. Perhaps we should make some kind of assessment of the findings of the OSSD and the Technical Division over the past five to ten years and assess the risks we would be taking if we discontinued them altogether. These are pretty costly programs if we have never made a find, or even if there have been two or three finds over the past five to ten years. How much insurance should we carry?

3. The possibility of combining the engineering functions of the Technical Division and the inspection functions with the Commo lab and communications security has been suggested in the earlier paragraphs relating to the Office of Communications.

4. The possibility of absorbing within the Office of Security the responsibilities and functions of the Security Staff in the Office of Logistics has been suggested in connection with OL.

5. The audio countermeasures program we know is under fire from the Executive Director (now the Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee).

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tions.

The possibility of absorbing within the Office of
Security the responsibilities and functions of the Security
Staff in the Office of Logistics has been suggested in con-
nection with OL.

The audio countermeasures program we know is
under fire from the Executive Director.

We have unofficial figures in our files as of 30
April 1972 that [] security careerists are assigned to
other components of the Agency, as follows: []

[]
[] The requirement for this number of full-time

Security careerists in each of these components could stand
a hard look, especially the Clandestine Service and DDS&T.

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